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Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000900080001-9  
KHRUSHCHEV

I. First, What does Khrushchev's assumption of the premiership mean?

A. The significance is that Khrushchev had the power to bring the move about. He decided to take the risks of being accused of becoming a latter-day Stalin and there were apparently no forces to stop him.

Khrushchev has to make only one more move to give himself Stalin-like powers--this would be to gain untrammelled control of the police--but we see no signs that he intends to do so. However, he probably has the last word in security police (KGB) affairs.

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C. In fact he now has his tentacles around all three centers of power--Party Presidium, <sup>Party</sup> Secretariat, and Council of Ministers <sup>of the Government</sup>.

1. As a result of his victories last year, he bosses the party presidium and has a firm hand over policy making.
2. As first secretary of the party, he supervises the all-important controlling group--the party apparatus.
3. By becoming chairman of the Council of Ministers he has now added the responsibility for day-to-day administration of the government and thus all channels of authority now lead to Khrushchev alone.

II. The question arises as to why he took the government post.

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A. It may be explained that Khrushchev is <sup>desire</sup> to be recognized as the top Soviet representative in international negotiations, particularly at <sup>a</sup> Summit conference.

B. A more basic reason is that he probably feels that his policies can be carried out more effectively if he, as premier, is directly responsible <sup>although he may delegate much of the authority,</sup> for their implementations.

III. Khrushchev has not <sup>as far,</sup> seen fit to shake up the Bulganin cabinet, however.

A. The only major change is the appointment of ~~Prez~~ Kozlov as a first deputy premier. He and Mikoyan, <sup>already</sup> also a first deputy, will probably be delegated most of the day to day responsibility for the government.

1. Mikoyan will undoubtedly continue to provide much of the behind-the-scenes brain work for Khrushchev and he probably doesn't aspire to a front man position.

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2. Kozlov, <sup>by far the largest of the lot. He</sup> former Leningrad party boss and more recently premier of the Russian Republic <sup>(RSFSR)</sup>, has risen rapidly under Khrushchev's sponsorship <sup>He is one to keep our eye on as</sup> and ~~may be~~ the next premier should Khrushchev decide to relinquish the post.

~~IV. Khrushchev's taking over the premiership will not solve the big problems although Soviet policy will probably be put into effect more rapidly.~~

- ~~A. He now faces the task of putting his agricultural machinery plan into operation without adversely affecting production.~~
- ~~B. There are still many wrinkles in the industrial reorganization to be ironed out.~~
- ~~C. And he will continue to be plagued with the old problem of trying to do everything in the economic sphere at once.~~

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D. On the party side, there is still the question of assuring political loyalty.

1. There is growing evidence that Mikhail Suslov, who ranks second in the Party Secretariat to Khrushchev, is not completely loyal to him and that he opposed the new farm machinery program,
2. Suslov and perhaps other leading "dogmatists" may soon find themselves out in the provinces with Malenkov and Kaganovich.
3. Khrushchev may be building up his protege Alexei Kirilenko as an eventual replacement for Suslov.
4. On the other hand   
Suslov may try to oust Khrushchev from the party secretariat soon. Even if this is true, his chances are poor.

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We expect no changes in basic Soviet foreign policy, which Khrushchev has controlled for some time.

A. In recent months, its execution has been characterized by a flamboyance, drive, and tactical flexibility typical of the new Premier.

1. We can expect a constant probing for weak spots in the West and rapid exploitation of every opportunity that is presented.